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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
 2. INTRODUCTION 
The idea that conceptual representations of our experiences can be construed in a 
unique way with the use of language is central to cognitive grammar. The main reason for the 
mechanisms of construal to occur is both the conscious and the unconscious tendency of the 
speaker to use language as a conduit for expressing thoughts, whether to simply organize 
these thoughts, communicate information or for any other function of language. (Evans, 2007, 
41). This means that a speaker’s choice of words, the way they combine into phrases, clauses 
and sentences, and finally, all the other linguistic and paralinguistic choices that are employed 
while producing the utterance are all influenced by the speaker’s encyclopaedic knowledge, 
emotional state, intention and subconscious factors. At the same time, all these also influence 
the way that the hearer will decode the message and derive meaning from it. While this might 
at first hint at a state of chaos within which different speakers and hearers all have 
significantly different ways of understanding a message, it is certainly not the case. Speakers 
of the same language are easily able to convey messages to each other without a significant 
loss of meaning, and the fact that both the grammar and the vocabulary of a language are 
internally consistent from speaker to speaker means that the conventionalization of forms is 
an intuitive aspect of linguistic behavior. This internal consistency is solid ground for the 
claim that, therefore, conceptualization and construal must also be somehow conventionalized 
to an extent. This claim can, of course, be tested by meticulous analysis and subsequent 
attempts to describe a cognitive grammar of a language, for example Radden and 
Dirven’sCognitive English Grammar (Radden and Dirven, 2007), which applies the often 
highly theoretical or possibly anecdotal findings of cognitive linguistics to living linguistic 
matter and tries to unveil a structure deeper than grammar – the structure of how linguistic 
and potentially linguistic information is stored, organized and processed in the mind of a 
speaker. However, such extensive work is still not sufficient to produce an exhaustive 
description of every possible linguistic situation or the minutiae of the processes of 
conceptualization and construal accompanying single, specific, semantic domains.We 
postulate that, were it possible to have such detailed bottom up descriptions for a large 
number of different semantic domains, it would likely be easier to reach more satisfying and 
more accurate general conclusions about a language’s cognitive grammar. 
That is exactly what this paper aims to contribute to. By selecting a small subset of the 
vocabulary of English and applying certain methods of analysis to this subset, it should be 
possible to arrive at some conclusions concerning the cognitive makeup of that subset within 
a (cognitive) linguistic system. We can see this method at work in a paper by Stanojević, 
Tralić and Ljubičić (2012), wherein the authors have chosen a subset of vocabulary - “anger” 
and anger-related nouns, and analyzed their immediate semantic neighborhood, folk models 
and conceptual characteristics to get a basic feeling of how this subset is conceptualized. 
Afterwards, several syntactic constructions within which the chosen vocabulary may occur in 
language use were picked (with their conceptual characteristics in mind), and the 
combinations of the chosen vocabulary and these constructions were then searched for in a 
corpus. The resulting numerical data showed that the conceptual characteristics of a 
grammatical form and the conceptual characteristics of a lexical form influence each other in 
language use, by determining which may co-occur with which. 
In this paper, we choose to focus on the semantic domain of emotion nouns in 
American English, for three reasons. First, emotion nouns are an interesting subject to think 
and talk about from a cognitive linguistic perspective. They refer to abstract states of mind 
(and body). These states they refer to are universal to all humankind, but are conceptualized 
differently from culture to culture. Actual emotions do not only trigger thoughts, but also 
physical reactions. And, finally, since they are so abstract, the only way to speak of emotions 
is by using a great number of metaphors or metonymies. This helps a lot in the context of 
cognitive linguistics, since the processes of metaphor and metonymy can be backtracked, and 
the path they trace may clearly reveal the path a mind takes when conceptualizing emotional 
states. Second, the cognitive linguistic aspects of emotions words have already been tackled 
by a number of known authors. In particular, we refer to Dziwirek and Lewandowska-
Tomaszczyk (2010), Glynn (2002), Gordon and Hobbs (2008), and Kövecses (2003).Third, 
emotion words are relatively frequent in American English, meaning there are other parts of 
language that frequently accompany them in usage, such as syntactic constructions – two of 
which we chose to focus on. 
 After the corpus research had been done, the data was systematized according to ad 
hoc, yet relevant, criteria into semantic subcategories from which detailed information about 
the constructions could be derived. At this point, the findings from the data could be 
compared to those of Dziwirek and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Glynn, Gordon and Hobbs, 
and Kövecses. Furthermore, some of our own conclusions could be drawn both from the data 
and the comparison, which provide further insight into the nature of cognitive grammar of 
emotion nouns in English, and possibly ask new questions to be answered by cognitive 
linguistics. 
 The paper itself is composed as follows: section 2 introduces the theoretical 
framework needed to understand our aims and methods, as well as a description and 
arguments for the method of research. Section 4 contains the data from the corpus research 
organized into tables. Section 5 comments on the results in the tables from the perspective of 
our theoretical framework, and section 6 wraps up the paper with a conclusion. 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
In this paper, we rely on the existing theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics 
concerning the processes of production of meaning and the way the mind stores lexical 
information.Specifically, we feel that the definitions of the processes of conceptualization and 
construal as defined by the Glossary (Evans, 2007), Langacker (2008) and Tuđman-Vuković 
(Tuđman Vuković, 2009) properly capture both the moment of real-world information 
entering a linguistic system, and the moment when this refined information is again 
manipulated to make it suitable for leaving the speaker’s mind. The definitions are as follows: 
conceptualization“The process of meaning construction to which language 
contributes. It does so by providing access to rich encyclopaedic knowledge and by 
prompting for complex processes of conceptual integration. Conceptualization relates 
to the nature of dynamic thought to which language can contribute. From the 
perspective of cognitive linguistics, linguistic units such as words do not ‘carry’ 
meaning(s), but contribute to the process of meaning construction which takes place at 
the conceptual level.” (Evans, 2007) 
“In the first place, meaning is not identified with concepts but with conceptualization, 
the term being chosen precisely to highlight its dynamic nature. Conceptualization is 
broadly defined to encompass any facet of mental experience. It is understood as (1) 
subsuming both novel and established conceptions; (2) not just “intellectual” notions, 
but sensory, motor, and emotive experience as well; (3) apprehension of the physical, 
linguistic, social, and cultural context; and (4) conceptions that develop and unfold 
through processing time (rather than being simultaneously manifested). So, even if 
“concepts” are taken as being static, conceptualization is not.” (Langacker, 2008) 
construal“An idea central to Cognitive Grammar. Relates to the way a language user 
chooses to ‘package’ and ‘present’ a conceptual representation as encoded in 
language, which in turn has consequences for the conceptual representation that the 
utterance evokes in the mind of the hearer. This is achieved by choosing a particular 
focal adjustment and thus linguistically ‘organising’ a scene in a specific way. In so 
doing, the speaker imposes a unique construal upon that scene.” (Evans, 2007) 
“As part of its conventional semantic value, every symbolic structure construes its 
content in a certain fashion. (…) In viewing a scene, what we actually see depends on 
how close we examine it, what we choose to look at, which elements we pay most 
attention to, and where we view it from.” (Langacker, 2008) 
“A key connection between conceptual and semantic structures are the mechanisms of 
construal, cognitive mechanisms which shape non-linguistic conceptual content into 
linguistic structures, and from which semantic structures, i.e. meaning, emerges.” 
(Tuđman-Vuković, 2009) 
A relevant example of different ways of construing are the two constructions we will be 
looking into: “to be” + participle + “by” OR ”with” + emotion noun. Even though they, at 
first glance, seem similar, the construction using “by” will necessarily be a passive 
construction in which the emotion is the semantic subject of the action, while “with” will 
imply instrumentality, and will place the emotion further away from the verb – further than 
the subject, but also further than an object, since the action is not transitive toward the 
emotion.  
Furthermore, the theory of conceptual metaphors, which defines metaphor as a conceptual 
mechanism used for conceptualizing a concept via another, more concrete or more highly 
structured concept (Lakoff, 1993), is central to the way data in the paper is analyzed and 
interpreted, since the concept of emotional states is highly abstract, meaning that a language 
will produce a highly figurative semantic domain around the concept. 
The literature used by this paper that focuses narrowly on the subject of the paper 
consists of several articles and books all dealing with cognitive semantics of emotion nouns in 
English. Kövecses (2003) establishes that emotions in English have a common master 
metaphor used to conceptualize them – EMOTIONS ARE FORCES. He also says that the 
conceptualization of emotion in English can easily be interpreted using Talmy’s theory of 
force dynamics, which in turn, when applied to emotions, reveals that while the master 
metaphor EMOTIONS ARE FORCES may not be obvious in every instance of language used 
to talk about emotions, it actually metonymically provides submetaphors of itself, which then 
allow for more linguistic variety and seemingly different conceptualizations of emotional 
states. To be exact, he realizes that to feel an emotion, the emotion must be triggered by a 
cause, may be actually blocked by the rational mind, and, if it is not blocked, will have some 
kind of an effect on the experiencer of the emotion, whether physical or mental. This interplay 
of cause, emotion, and experiencer is easily translated into a force-dynamics situation. Then, 
Kövecses notices that these phases of being affected by an emotion are what allow metonymy 
(pertaining to a single phase being part of the entire process of an emotion behaving as a 
force) in conceptualizing the examples from English where the master metaphor is not 
obvious. For example, while “overtaken by anger” is clearly a situation involving opposed 
forces (the person’s resistance to being affected by anger as opposed to the consuming 
emotion), “steaming with anger” represents a different relation between concepts. However, 
“steaming” is a metaphorical expression for a person feeling hot, and feeling hot is an actual 
consequence of being affected by anger, i.e., the last part of the force-dynamics schema of the 
EMOTIONS ARE FORCES master metaphor. Therefore, the master metaphor is still here, 
even though not immediately noticeable. However, which part of such a schema will be 
singled out and chosen as the vessel for conceptualization depends on extralinguistic factors, 
such as cultural preferences. Or, as Kövecses puts it in his own words: 
“The major claim I am making here is this: Systematic links take us from (possibly 
universal) actual physiology of anger through conceptualized metonymy and metaphor 
to cultural models. In the process, the broader cultural contexts also play a crucial role, 
in that they fill out the details left open in the schematic basic structure. In other 
words, I believe that we can offer a satisfactory explanation of the emergence of 
cultural models of emotions if we take into account the possibly universal experiential 
basis of our emotion concepts, the conceptualization of this experiential basis by 
means of conceptual metonymies, the conceptual metaphors that often derive from 
these metonymies, and the broader cultural context.“ 
It should be pointed out that more recent research (e.g. Stanojević, Tralić, Ljubičić, 2012), 
however, points to conceptual characteristics of grammatical forms which are used during 
construal having an impact on the final cultural models of concepts as well. 
 Gordon and Hobbs (Gordon and Hobbs, 2008) take a look at the entire set of words 
denoting emotional states in English. They make a claim that there are thirty-three basic sets 
of emotion nouns in English, mostly non-polysemic (p4, 2008), and indicate that there are 
more terms for emotions in English than there would be basic predicates for emotion in 
cognitive theory, meaning that experiential “primitives”, or basic physically-based non-
abstract concepts (such as the concept of having a certain physical sensation while feeling an 
emotion) act as building blocks which may combine into more complex concepts. However, 
the most interesting point they make is in the conclusion: 
“Natural language understanding requires a large knowledge base of commonsense 
knowledge that explicates concepts in coherent theories and links lexical items with 
these theories. In order to achieve high accuracy, high complexity results, this effort 
must be manual (as indeed dictionaries are constructed manually). Early efforts will 
have the most impact if done for the most central concepts and the most common word 
senses.” 
While what they say here does not (on its own) add to our understanding of the processes of 
conceptualization and construal accompanying the use of emotion nouns in English, it does 
agree with the method of research of this paper – namely, the attempt to focus on a single 
semantic domain in order to create an exhaustive description of it.  
 The work of Dziwirek-Tomaszczyk and Lewandowska (2010) Complex Emotions and 
Grammatical Mismatches: A Contrastive Corpus-based Studyshares the aim and focus of this 
paper to an extent. The authors study verbs, adjectives and nouns denoting emotions in 
English and Polish in order to find the similarities and differences in their conceptualization 
and means of construal. However, nouns seem to be the least covered, except in one short 
chapter dedicated to them. The authors explain that this is due toemotion nouns being very 
rarely used as a direct object of a verb in English (p 103, 2010), and therefore not providing a 
rich source of information on how emotional states behave cognitively in the language. While 
this might be true, it strikes as somewhat baffling that the only two questions that the authors 
raise about emotion nouns are: 
“The initial question we want to pose is what do we do with emotions? Specifically, what do 
we do with emotion nouns?”, and “Which emotion nouns are selected by which verbs?” 
While these are legitimate questions in the context of thinking about how these words behave 
in a language, it is unclear why the authors avoid emotion nouns with syntactic functions 
other than just ‘direct object’. However, what their work does do is set up a conceptual 
representation of the mentioned emotional states. These representations match with 
Kövecses’s claim that conceptualizing emotions in English rests upon a single master 
metaphor or metonymically derived parts of the master metaphor, providing plenty of 
secondary evidence for his claim. 
 The findings from our literature allow us to complete a set of parameters according to 
which this paper will proceed. Namely: 
- there mightexist a master metaphor for talking and thinking about emotional states in 
English 
- a structural part of this master metaphor may be isolated to allow the production of 
other metaphorical expressions – however, as these expressions are still derived from 
the master metaphor, the system remains “closed” 
- studying very specific linguistic manifestations of a concept may still provide insight 
into the inner working of the concept, but also into other aspects of a language, 
provided that a sufficient number of similar studies are performed upon these aspect as 
well 
- emotion nouns rarely take on the function of the direct object in English 
The first two provide a firm ground from which to start the analysis, while the second two 
affect the way this paper chooses the subject of its research. That is, we decided to look at 
emotion nouns in a very specific syntactic context (we will be using the Corpus of 
Contemporary American English, from hereafter COCA), since this will allow for more 
accuracy in our findings, will put the emotion nouns in a conceptual content that will say 
something about the conceptual makeup of emotion nouns, but also, to avoid studying 
emotion nouns while functioning as direct objects in English, as this would both cause an 
overlap with Dziwirek and Lewandowska’s work and significantly reduce the amount of data 
a corpus search would provide. Therefore, the following two syntactic constructions were 
chosen, in which emotion nouns will be searched for and analyzed. These are: 
a) “to be” + full verb past participle + “by” + emotion noun;  
(corpus example: “Whether that affection is real or driven by fear is hard to tell.”) 
b) “to be” + “full verb past participle” + “with” + emotion noun 
(corpus example: “He was filledwithanger and sorrow.”) 
Or, to define these within morphosyntax: prepositional phrases in postmodification of an 
adjectival or participial copular argument. Both constructions are passive constructions with 
the agent not omitted.So, if emotion nouns are looked at within these environments, the 
following may be presupposed: 
- Due to the prepositions controlling the noun, the noun will act either as the agent of 
the action, or the instrument of the action 
- The participles and adjectives will provide information on what emotions themselves 
“do” (as opposed to only asking what can be done with them in Dziwirek and 
Lewandowska) and what kinds of effects they can have on the experiencer 
- Making the consequence or effect of an emotion the focus means we also focus on the 
last part of the structure of the master metaphor for emotions.  
Of course, these predictions need not prove true. It is very likely that the corpus will provide 
examples which clash with these predictions, especially the first and the third one. With this 
in mind, we move on to the actual research. 
 3. RESEARCH AND DATA 
For the actual nouns denoting emotions, the following were chosen: awe, desire, fear, 
hate, jealousy, joy, love, worry. The original idea was to try and build a list of “basic” 
emotions, since having such a list would probably help in reaching conclusions about our 
data. However, after researching the Internet for such a list or any firm scientific guidelines to 
build it from scratch, this idea was discarded. Unfortunately, contemporary psychology and 
cognitive sciences are at a loss while trying to define what makes an emotion “basic”, how to 
categorize them, or even how to define some of the emotions in a consistent way across 
various theoretical frameworks. The variety of tables trying to categorize emotions did often 
have something in common, however. They depict all emotions as having a tendency to assert 
an effect upon the possibly unwilling experiencer, which confirms Kövecses’s link to Talmy’s 
force dynamics, and shows that emotions are often conceptualized as agents of an action 
performed upon a patient. Ultimately, we chose four emotion words that have already been 
researched in ways related to our methodology, and four other unresearched ones. All eight 
“feel” basic, and can be found listed as such across the aforementioned variety of emotion 
categorization tables online. Here is a short overview: 
Desire – MacMillan defines desire as “a strong feeling of wanting to have or to do 
something”. It is tackled from a linguistic perspective in Alice Deignan’s article (2001). 
Therein, desire is said to be associated with fire-related metaphors (2001, 24), 
conceptualized as a being or entity separate to its experiencer (2001, 25) and an 
unwelcome force that, to the experiencer, represents an opponent to struggle against 
(2001, 25). The article also makes an interesting, more generalized conclusion about the 
nature of conceptualization of stronger emotions: 
 "An examination of several groups of metaphors suggests that we fear desire, 
possibly for its potential to disrupt the established patterns of our lives; desire 
is talked of metaphorically as a wild animal, and as the dangerous and 
elemental forces of water, fire and electricity. Another entailment of these 
metaphors, and a general tendency in the discussion of powerful emotions, is 
a denial that desire is a part of ourselves; we project it linguistically onto 
objects or forces outside ourselves. Thus desire appears uninvited and takes 
us over; we are not responsible. This both reflects our physical perception of 
desire and allows us to disclaim responsibility for ‘sinful’ desire." 
Fear– In MacMillan, fear is “the feeling that you have when you are frightened”, which 
does not help much. In Kövecses (1990), fear is “often defined as a dangerous situation 
accompanied by a set of physiological and behavioral reactions that typically ends in 
flight” (1990, 69).This definition matches the way Kövecses later analyzes an emotion 
event (cause of emotion > experiencer feels emotion > emotion has further consequences 
on the experiencer). He also notices that a way to conceptualize fear is via its causes by 
focusing on the first part of the emotion event schema (1990, 76). 
Joy–MacMillan’s joy is “a feeling of great happiness”. We also find joy in 
Stefanowitsch’s article (Stefanowitsch, 2004), but the article focuses on methodology 
rather than actual research. Still, he does confirm the definition from MacMillan 
(Stefanowitsch, 2004, 139-140). 
Love – Love as defined by MacMillan is “a very strong emotional and sexual feeling for 
someone”. Furthermore, Stanojević (Stanojević, 2013) provides an overview of the ways 
love can be conceptualized in English. In short, love can be a bounded object, a valuable 
resource, a relationship between two people, or an external force which forces a person to 
act in a specific way (2013, 180).  
For the remaining four, we will simply provide a definition from MacMillan: 
Awe– “a feeling of great respect and admiration, often combined with fear” 
Hate – “to dislike someone or something very much” 
Jealousy–“an unhappy feeling because someone has something that you would like or can 
do something that you would like to do” 
Worry – “the feeling of being worried”, but since it is circular, here is the definition of 
the verb as well: “to feel nervous and upset because you keep thinking about a problem 
that you have or could have in the future” 
 
 
However, before the main research, a larger list of emotion nouns was chosen in order to 
be checked for frequency in the corpus along with their adjectival pairs (e.g. happiness – 
happy). This would try to explain Dziwirek and Lewandowska’s tendency to avoid nouns for 
emotional states in their research and instead focus on adjectives.The table shows that the 
most frequent forms are the shorter, or underived ones, by a long margin. These are the ones 
that are the best to start from when performing this kind of research, as a more frequent form 
will occur in more different linguistic contexts, allowing for more evidence and a more 
precise analysis of the nature of their conceptualization. 
  
 The next step was to perform the actual corpus research. Each particular emotion noun 
was searched paired with both prepositions, and alongside collocating past participial forms 
within 4 spaces in front of the preposition.The minimum frequency was set to 0, and the 
results were ordered by frequency. This means that both conventional expressions and 
potentially novel or unique combinations would come up. After a long list of collocating 
participles (along with their frequencies) that govern the prepositional phrase was acquired, 
the meanings of the verbs that the participles have been derived from were observed online in 
Emotion 
Noun/Emotion 
Adjective 
Frequency (N) Frequency (Adj) Noun or Adjective 
Ahead? 
happiness / happy 8177 55810 Adj 
joy / joyous or joyful 15027 1131 or 1361 N 
pleasure / pleased 19306 11811 N 
depression / 
deppresed 
19367 6771 N 
grief / grieving 7576 1949 N 
distress / distressed 5748 1865 N 
sadness / sad 4734 17674 Adj 
misery / miserable 3678 4333 Adj 
sorrow / sorrowful 3146 418 N 
unhappiness / 
unhappy 
1011 5824 Adj 
anger / angry 19208 24037 Adj 
fear / afraid 49410 31099 N 
MacMillan Dictionary and Thesaurus, checked for metaphoricity using the Pragglejazz 
procedure (Pragglejazz 2007), and two tables were made categorizing the participles 
according to most apparent semantic distinctions and similarities between them. These are the 
resulting tables: 
 
PARTICIPLE + BY  
Attacked FRQ With Emotions 
Hit 1 Awe 
Pierced 1 Desire 
Pricked 1 Jealousy 
Struck 1 Joy 
  
Emotional 
Pressure 
FRQ  
Tortured 2 Jealousy, worry 
Tormented 1 Desire 
Haunted 1 Worry 
  
Controlled FRQ  
Ruled 14 Desire, fear, worry 
Overcome 11 Desire, fear, joy, worry 
Seized 6 Jealousy, joy 
Overwhelmed 6 Desire, fear 
Overtaken 3 Fear 
Possessed 1 Desire 
Owned 1 Joy 
Enslaved 1 Desire 
Seduced 1 Joy 
Governed 1 Joy 
  
Eaten FRQ  
Consumed 6 Hate, worry 
Devoured 1 Jealousy 
   
Motivation FRQ  
Motivated 54 Desire, fear, hate, jealousy, 
love 
Driven 54 Desire, fear, hate, jealousy, 
love, worry 
Inspired  13 Fear, love 
Moved 6 Desire, jealousy, love 
Prompted 4 Fear, worry 
Guided 3 Love 
Animated 2 Love 
Fueled  1 Jealousy 
Powered 1 Joy 
Spurred 1 Desire 
Stoked  1 
 
 
Jealousy 
  
Physically 
altered 
FRQ  
Torn 2 Hate, jealousy 
Transformed 2 Desire, joy 
Broken 1 Hate 
Destroyed 1 Jealousy 
Twisted 1 Hate 
Carved 1 Hate 
Tempered 1 Worry 
Strengthened 1 Hate 
Colored 1 Jealousy 
Frayed 1 Worry 
Lit 1 Joy 
  
Physically 
Inhibited 
FRQ  
Paralyzed 21 Awe, fear, worry 
Gripped 17 Fear 
Blinded 12 Hate, love 
Bound 6 Love 
Frozen 5 Fear 
Immobilized 4 Fear 
Inhibited 3 Fear 
Burdened 2 Desire 
Crippled 1 Jealousy 
Besieged 1 Hate 
Tethered 1 Awe 
  
Emotion 
causing 
emotion 
FRQ  
Frightened 1 Desire 
 
  
PARTICIPLE + WITH  
Afflicted FRQ With Emotions 
Drunk 5 Joy, love 
Intoxicated 2 Love 
Fevered 2 Love 
Exhausted 2 Worry 
Contaminated 1 Hate 
  
Attacked FRQ  
Struck 8 Awe, fear 
Smitten 1 Jealousy 
  
Destroyed FRQ  
Consumed 29 Desire, fear, hate, jealousy, 
joy, love , worry 
Absorbed 1 Desire 
  
Filled or 
overflowing 
container 
FRQ  
Filled 219 Awe, desire, fear. hate, 
jealousy, joy, love, worry 
Overwhelmed 18 Desire, joy, love 
Suffused 7 Awe 
Swollen/swelle
d 
2/4 Desire, love 
Flushed 5 Jealousy, joy 
Flooded 4 Fear, joy 
Charged 2 Awe, hate 
Deluged 2 Hate 
   
Saturated 1 Desire 
Inundated 1 Hate 
  
Physically 
Altered 
FRQ  
Creased 8 Worry 
Contorted 8 Fear, worry 
Etched 6 Worry 
Ragged 2 Worry 
Twisted 2 Hate 
Wrinkled 2 Worry 
Darkened 1 Hate 
Strained 1 Worry 
Riddled 
(negative 
conn) 
1 Jealousy 
  
Physically 
Altered using 
Instrument 
FRQ  
Glazed 1 Love 
Weighted 1 Awe 
  
Emotion 
causing 
emotion 
FRQ  
Wracked 3 Worry 
Shaken 1 Awe 
 
 4. DISCUSSION 
a) Table 2 – by + participle 
The tables in section 3 show the arrangement of the results, that is, of the participial forms 
yielded from corpus searches, into categories defined by a common meaning derived from the 
basic meanings of category members. The adjacent column tells us the raw frequency in 
COCA, and the last column shows which emotions collocate with which participles. The data 
in the tables points to several conclusions concerning the nature of the prepositions “by” and 
“with”, as well as the conceptualization of emotions and the experiencer of the emotion. First, 
in table 1, it appears that all the participles imply the emotion noun as an agent. The mental 
image is that of an outside force (i.e., the emotion) exerting an influence upon the experiencer 
and changing or afflicting it in some way, usually by changing some state of the experiencer’s 
being, either mental or physical. The only slight deviation from this is the “Eaten” category, 
wherein the emotion is conceptualized as an actual living being with a (great) need to feed. 
Furthermore, the participle “frozen” in the “Physically Inhibited” category upgrades on the 
general notion of “outside force” to the specific “natural force” in examples such as “A New 
York cop, frozen by fear”, wherein the verb denotes a natural process governed by physical 
laws. Apart from being more specific, both deviations are, however, consistent with the 
general force metaphor. 
The emotion is conceptualized as an agent, and the experiencer is conceptualized as a 
patient of the transitive action performed by the agent. This is expected from the passive 
construction. Most of the categories seem to present the patient as a physical object subject to 
external manipulation and physical alteration. The categories labeled “Controlled”, 
“Motivation”, and “Emotion causing emotion”, however, also require of the patient to be a 
living being capable of either conscious control of his actions and thought or feeling 
emotions. Furthermore, the experiencer in “Motivation” differs from all the others in that it 
does not seem to necessarily resist the influence of the emotion, but is simply in a state of 
inaction or inertia until pushed by the emotion.  
Looking at the frequencies, it is noticeable that most participles are quite low-frequency. 
Even though one might expect that this would mean a lot of unique cases which could not be 
easily grouped with others, the semantic grouping into categories was actually very intuitive. 
Most of the results with a single hit are just synonyms of others with equal or higher 
frequencies. Secondly, the categories with the highest overall frequencies are “Motivation” 
and “Physically Inhibited”, with the number of results greatly outnumbering those in the other 
categories. What this implies is that this is the most usual way speakers of American English 
conceptualize emotions – as outside forces that either incite or impede action of the targets of 
their influence, i.e., forces that control our conscious selves and our behavior. Meanwhile, the 
conceptualization of emotions present in other categories seems not to be as salient in 
everyday language (due to observed frequencies), but still follows the main metaphorical 
principle of EMOTIONS ARE FORCES without much deviation. 
So to conclude, it seems that the preposition “by” introduces the notion of agency when 
used with emotions. Even though MacMillan offers some definitions of “by” governing a 
noun as a semantic instrument, none of these seem to apply to the cases seen in this table. 
b) Table 3 – with + participle 
At first glance, this table shares many similarities with the previous one. Some of the 
categories are identical, some nearly identical and sharing the same results. However, upon 
inspection, the differences in conceptualization become apparent. First of all, emotion nouns 
act as semantic agents only in categories named “Physically Altered” and “Emotion causes 
emotion”. The second category contains only one example, and the first 31. Their semantic 
behavior can be explained by definitions of “with” in MacMillan that allow the argument of 
“with” to act as an agent.Other categories, excluding “Filled or overflowing container”, 
unfailingly conceptualize the emotion as an instrument which is used to perform some action 
or alteration upon the experiencer. Even the category “Destroyed”, which seems very similar 
to the category “Eaten” in the previous table due to “consumed” being the most frequent 
result, cannot be interpreted in such a way that the emotion becomes the agent, due to the 
confines of “with” being used alongside the two verbs denoting some kind of eating. 
“Consumed by” and “consumed with” imply two different kinds of relationship between the 
arguments and their governing units. The second one might not even be instrumentality, but 
rather a kind of accompaniment or even modality –in the example “She was so consumed 
with lust that she didn’t know what to say” the participle itself might be sufficient to describe 
the experiencer’s state of mind independently of the emotion that caused it. So, the mind was 
consumed – which can metonymically mean “destroyed” or “snuffed out of existence”, either 
by using lust as a catalyst (instrumentality), an ally helping to that end (accompaniment), or 
by being lustful (modality). Looking at the etymology of “with”, the intended meaning 
perhaps becomes a bit more apparent. Namely, the Online Etymology Dictionary mentions 
that, while the Old English wið meant „against“ or „opposite“, the sense shifted in Middle 
English “to denote association, combination, and union”. This means that the contemporary 
“with” might also (like in our case with lust) denote a kind of relation where the related units 
are not conceptualized as apart from one another, but rather as functioning in union. 
Therefore, "a mind consumed with lust" might mean the mind and the emotion becoming one 
and the same. 
The category with the highest overall frequency, however, is the “Filled or overflowing 
container”, which exhibits a somewhat different behavior from the others. MacMillan offers 
the following definition of with (among many others): “used for saying what is in or on 
something, for example what fills or covers it”. Conceptually, being filled with substance 
means that the substance is essentially in control of its container –meaning that this category 
follows the EMOTIONS ARE FORCES metaphoric principle as well. 
Concerning the conceptualization of the experiencer, the categories “Afflicted” and 
“Emotion causing emotion” require the patient to be a living being with a physiology capable 
of being afflicted by poison, illness or exhaustion, or a living being capable of feeling 
emotions. Other categories conceptualize the experiencer as an object upon which a physical 
effect or alteration has been performed – and “Filled or overflowing container” adds to this 
that the object should be a container object. It should be noted that, as mentioned in earlier 
research (Stanojević, Tralić, Ljubičić, 2012, 144), it is more difficult tomake conclusions 
about the conceptualization of a second participant of a predicate, since it is conceptually 
“further” from the core of the construed concept than the first participant.  
Another thing to comment on is the distribution of emotions by which participles 
accompany which emotions (the third column). The numbers are too low to claim anything 
about specific emotions, but it is more than obvious that some particular verbs allow for most 
or all of the emotions. Namely, there are “motivated” and “driven” in the first table, 
suggesting that all of the emotions are often conceptualized as external driving forces, and 
“filled” and “consumed” in the second table, meaning that all of the emotions are capable of 
being conceptualized as both a liquid and a ravenous beast. 
So, in conclusion, “with” is less straightforward in its construal of emotion nouns and 
their experiencers, being able to present the emotion both as an agent and an instrument in 
Comment [U1]: Fine, I 
understand.  
Comment [U2]: this is a 
rather specific piece of 
information, therefore, you 
should add a page number. 
different cases (depending on the action of the verb of the participle). The most salient mental 
image of this construal with speakers of American English, however, seems to be that of the 
emotion being a liquid capable of filling up the container that is the experiencer of the 
emotion.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Both of the constructions we focused on are passive, meaning that the emotion words will 
be a bit further from the focus of the emotion, but since they are not omitted and function as 
semantic subjects, a lot can be derived from their relationship with the verb that appears in the 
construction. We get a lot of different possible conceptualizations for each emotion in each 
construction, but they can be explained via Kővecses’s EMOTIONS ARE FORCES 
metaphor. However, since we chose to observe the conceptualizations in only two possible 
syntactic contexts (unlike most of the authors from the literature we refer to), there is a 
smaller variety of possible conceptualizations and conceptual metaphors in the corpus results 
than there would be if we observed the emotion words in more such contexts (or all of them). 
This is due to the emotion words in our paper performing only two different semantic roles 
(agent and instrument), and their actions being necessarily transitive in relation to the 
experiencer, meaning that the verb accompanying them will be more informative about the 
relation between the emotion and its experiencer than about the more general conceptual 
makeup of the emotion word in our mind. However, such specific data may still be useful if 
this type of research is meticulously applied to all possible linguistic contexts within which a 
word (emotion word or any other) may appear, since we can expect that a general view can be 
built bottom-up, from numerous very specific analyses.  
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